On May 16th, 2011,
El Faro ran the story about one of the three drug trafficking rings that operate in Salvadoran territory.
They called that story The Texis Cartel. The piece reveals the activities of a hotel owner that has managed to infiltrate the National Civilian Police and the Salvadoran political establishment in order to control an important path for cocaine illicit traffic in the Northwestern part of the country.
On June 26th, 2012, more than a year after that first piece and after having been victims of harassment and threats, El Faro reporters ran the second part of the Texis story, which they entitled
"A councilman to get to the Texis Cartel". The electronic journal uncovers on that piece how a councilman of the Metapán municipality -the largest city under the influence of the Cartel- negotiated the sell of five kilos of coca to Police undercover agents. Another scoop: the ultimate goal of that police operation -ordered during the tenure of former PNC Director, Commissioner Carlos Ascencio- was José Adán Salazar Umaña, aka Chepe Diablo, identified by police intelligence as the cartel leader. After the councilman's arrest investigations of the Texis Cartel have stopped.
El 16 de mayo de 2011, el periódico digital El Faro de El Salvador publicó la primera entrega sobre uno de los tres grandes anillos de narcotráfico que operan en el país centroamericano, al que llamó el Cártel de Texis. La historia detalla cómo un grupo de narcotraficantes dirigidos por un empresario hotelero ha logrado infiltrar la policía y al estamento político salvadoreño para controlar una amplia zona de tránsito de droga en la esquina noroccidental del país.
El 26 de junio de 2012, más de un año después de la primera publicación y tras ser víctimas de acoso, amenazas y persecución, los periodistas de El Faro publicaron la segunda entrega sobre la organización de narcos, titulada "Un concejal para llegar al Cártel de Texis". Ahí, el periódico revela que un concejal de la alcaldía de Metapán, la ciudad más grande bajo la influencia del cártel, había intentado negociar la venta de cinco kilos de cocaína con agentes encubiertos de la Policía. Otra revelación: el objetivo último del operativo policial contra ese concejal, Jesús Sanabria, era José Adán Salazar, alias Chepe Diablo, identificado por la inteligencia de la PNC como el líder del cártel. Tras la captura del concejal, las investigaciones contra Texis se han estancado.
Traduzco aquí al inglés la primera entrega sobre el Cártel de Texis publicada por El Faro.
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| Calle de Texistepeque |
The Texis Cartel
Three
state intelligence reports and several high-level informants report that a
large hotelier is allied with deputies, policemen, mayors and gangs in the
northwest of El Salvador to make up the Texis Cartel, an organization that has
managed to survive more than a decade of investigation by national and
international authorities. It is a larger organization than Los Perrones, say
those who have led this investigation for four months. They are described as
drug traffickers operating in El Caminito, the shortcut that El Salvador
provides to the international traffic moving South American cocaine to the
United States. Corruption and violence open the road along the way.
Sergio
Arauz, Oscar Martínez, Efren Lemus / Photos: Frederick Meza
elfaro.net
/ Published on May 16, 2011
Part I: The reports and the informants
The
pick-up's old engine seems to complain about the burden of more than a dozen
white sacks crammed into the narrow bed of the vehicle. Maseca flour, say the
markings on each sack. It is the first of two vehicles crossing a narrow
concrete bridge, across the dividing line between Honduras and El Salvador, a
border where there are no checkpoints or questions.
"Aren't
you going to check it? Check it!" A visitor to the area says to the two
soldiers who are the only ones keeping any kind of eye on this transit point and
have been surprised by a plainclothes policeman.
The
soldiers defend their indifference
"There
are many cars and people. We can't check them all one by one," says one of
the soldiers in a quiet voice, as if accepting the reprimand.
That
point is called San Fernando, a poor and small town in Chalatenango that has a
handful of houses, a church, a diner, a small school and no police station. The
role of police and customs agents is fulfilled by two short men dressed in
olive green and military caps. Each one has an M-16 and a smile that welcome
visitors. They greet every passing car at the edge of town. No questions or
procedures.
"There's
not a cop in sight, and at night it is even easier to get through," says
the officer who surprised the soldiers of Sumpul Command, the military force
responsible for the blind spots on the Salvadoran borders.
The soldiers he has told
off are accustomed to seeing trucks, pick ups and all kinds of vehicles pass by freely.
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This is the blind spot of San Fernando,
Chalatenango, where the cocaine road known as El Caminito begins.
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San
Fernando is a wide open door, where people and goods alike go freely on toward
Honduras, and people and goods enter freely from Honduras too. At the San
Fernando border they rarely check whether products such as these bags of Maseca
actually contain what the label claims. There are trucks loaded with goods,
Honduran children who come to San Fernando to study, guns, bags of flour and
other bags that also contain a white powder, but a very different substance:
cocaine. San Fernando is the beginning of the Salvadorian route which moves
some of the cocaine from South America towards the United States.
This is
where, according to three different intelligence reports that were the basis
for this investigation, you enter the territory of "Chepe Diablo," (meaning
Chepe the Devil, in English) the drug lord of the West, the head of one of the
country's largest cartels and one of the wealthiest drug traffickers in the
north of the State of Santa Ana. "Chepe Diablo ", according to police
intelligence officials and various security department personnel, is one of the
three founders of the Texis cartel. His real name is José Adán Salazar Umaña.
Salazar
Umaña is a folksy 62-year Salvadoran known in four different social worlds:
tourism entrepreneurs know him as a hotel owner, people from the soccer world
know him as the boss of the first division soccer team Metapán and chairman of
Salvadoran soccer's First Division, in the livestock sector he is known as a
prominent rancher, and in the public security sector and in secret reports by
the state he is described as a "businessman, rancher and drug
trafficker".
The
police, the army and the District Attorney’s Office know about Chepe Diablo.
Intelligence reports obtained in this investigation clearly state that he is
one of the leaders of the cartel that controls the route that starts in San
Fernando. The road runs south to Dulce Nombre de Maria, where it turns to the
west, passing through Nueva Concepción and reaching the town of Metapán, in the
upper left corner of the map of El Salvador, which borders with Guatemala. This
drugs route is currently close to achieving a promotion with the opening of a
highway, the Northern Longitudinal Highway. The police investigating Salazar
and his group call the cartel's operational area the Northern Cocaine Route or
El Caminito.
The
report that initiated the investigation is dated March 22, 2000, and El Faro
got hold of it in December last year. It contains data collected by police
investigators and is titled "Metapán Case", number 003/00. During our
reporting other documents were added from between 2008 and this year. The investigations
cover three presidential terms, those of Francisco Flores and Antonio Saca of
Arena, and Mauricio Funes of the FMLN. The police investigations have been
conducted under the direction of five directors of the National Civil Police (PNC):
Mauricio Sandoval, Ricardo Menesses, Rodrigo Avila, Francisco Rovira, José Luis
Tobar Prieto and Carlos Ascencio.
The drugs
passing through San Fernando come mostly from the Atlantic coast of Honduras,
and reach Honduras mainly at two sites. By sea, speedboats from Colombia cross
the empty Caribbean off Nicaragua and make short stops until they reach the
Honduran border region of Gracias a Dios. By air, light aircraft land in the
Honduran jungle region of Olancho or on the border between the two countries
marked by the River Coco. The drugs move on by cutting across central Honduras until
arriving to the State of Ocotepeque, on the border with El Salvador,
Chalatenango, and San Fernando.
San
Fernando is the release point where the Honduran hand the baton to the
Salvadorans, in a journey that is managed by Colombians and Mexicans. It is a
highway that moves millions of dollars in profits for its leaders, who are
disguised as businessmen, ranchers, mayors, policemen, gangsters, Coyotes and
deputies. Each plays a role: the policemen bought by the narcos guard and
transport the drugs, remove roadblocks, and give warning of any security
operations; the mayors give building permits, formalize business deals and give
privileged information, and in one case, even lead a group; the gang members
kill and traffic in local markets; deputies give access to the upper echelons
of power: and some judges and prosecutors make sure that any prosecution
attempt is blocked by the weight of a very meticulous bureaucracy.
How much
money is Chepe Diablo handling? In the past five years he has declared a revenue
totaling more than $ 30 million. Only in 2008, the flagship year of the
international financial crisis, José Adán Salazar Umaña declared to the
Treasury more than $ 9 million in revenue from commercial activities.
The
United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime estimates that each year between 500
and 600 tons of cocaine cross Central America into the United States - at least
since 2006. The United States Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) and the
National Civil Police have declared to international media and also directly to
this newspaper that El Caminito carries a large percentage of the cocaine
passing through El Salvador, which is the fashionable route today, being the
main supply route for the cartels in Guatemala.
The Texis
Cartel's drug traffickers work as free agents in the international cocaine
market: they are the suppliers of the Gulf Cartel, the Sinaloa cartel and the
Zetas ... Whoever pays gets its services and has the way open to El Caminito,
which ends at the Salvadoran border town of Santa Ana, adjacent to the
Guatemalan State of Jutiapa, a well-known bastion of drug traffickers in that
country.
During
four months of research, El Faro visited El Caminito and spoke with policemen,
soldiers, mayors, government secretaries, police commissioners, intelligence
sources and investigators who have worked for the DEA. These are the results
and the evidence. These sources often requested anonymity. They all know of the
Texis Cartel and they all know of Chepe Diablo and his partners.
"The
road that starts here spreads money. Did you see those two soldiers?"
asked The Detective, one of the key sources that guided us.
The
Detective is a police investigator who has participated in anti-drug operations
in collaboration with agencies like the DEA, to which he is one of the leading
information providers. We reply that we did see those two soldiers.
"They are content with nothing: a plate of food,
$ 10 Dollars...
"We're surprised: anything could happen here, and
anytime.
"It's
an open nozzle. Did you see those bags of flour? It could have been cocaine and
nobody asked anything.
The first
clue of the Texis Cartel reached us in December 2010. A close adviser of former
President Antonio Saca approached us to give us information about what he
called "a large case" that has never been resolved by the
authorities.
"This
is not new, the file is with the DEA, the National Civil Police (PNC), even the
District Attorney’s Office. Ask for yourselves and you will see that I'm not
lying," he said.
- And Saca knew about this? We asked.
"Ha, ha, ha,
everyone knows this, it comes under the responsibility of The Perrones."
The Perrones
are a gang that police began investigating in 2003 and which ended up falling
apart in 2008. When the authorities began to track drug dealers in the east of
the country, they had already been following the tracks of the Texis Cartel for
at least two years.
The
theory that this contact explained to us in a cafeteria on December 15 of that
year was that the growth of the Texis Cartel and its professionalism over the
past 10 years was such that prosecuting it is an almost impossible challenge
for the Police, who do not find a strong ally in the District Attorney’s Office.
"Until
it seriously affects the interests of the Yanks, the traffic will
continue," he predicted.
That
first report was 60 pages long, with maps of clandestine landing strips, records
with general data about the leading members of the cartel, and sketches showing
the locations of the businesses of the people investigated.
This
first report mentioned the main partners of Chepe Diablo: Juan Umaña Samayoa,
mayor of the municipality of Metapán, and a prominent politician from the
right-wing National Conciliation Party (PCN), and Roberto Antonio Herrera, aka
El Burro (which means The Donkey in English), former president of the Livestock
Fair of Santa Ana, whom the FBI and the DEA have been targeting for at least
five years.
In early
February 2011, when distrust of a report that didn't even say who had written
it began to transform into certainty and into some concrete clues, a senior
police officer confirmed to us that José Adán Salazar Umaña, Roberto Antonio
Herrera and the Mayor of Metapán were running criminal activities. He said that
according to the police, the report was true, and that it even fell short in
terms of the extent of the network. This was told to us by a police
commissioner, who we call The Commissioner.
Weeks
passed and one day The Commissioner turned up with a folder under his arm. He
gave us the Second Report, one produced by police intelligence, one with an
author's name confirming what was written in the First Report and going into
more detail about the members of the network and their way of operating.
The days
passed and the talks continued until one day The Commissioner was accompanied
by a man in civilian clothes. That day, The Commissioner introduced us to The
Detective.
"He
knows about the topic you want to investigate, he is reliable and he is in the
field," he told us by way of introduction.
The
Detective, from that first meeting, began to discuss in detail the role of each
member of this hidden cartel, explained its dimensions and put a voice to the
reports.
"Look,
all these drug dealers have a general manager, there are more people higher up.
In the west these people are. Now, each one has a network of people. Behind
every head is a network of 'family', people you trust. Chepe Diablo alone has
more than 50 people and each person has others, he doesn't get his hands dirty
anymore.
Although
the police as an institution refused to cooperate with our investigation, our
informants decided to give the green light to open up to our questions and
requests for information: but it soon became necessary to find other sources.
We could not run the risk that the First Report also came from the police,
which would give us a case based only on information from a source. However,
talking was very difficult for the officials we went to. José Adán Salazar
Umaña is a name that we heard about from all our sources, but he is still free
despite years of investigation. He is a very well-protected narco, they said.
What would I get out of talking?, they seemed to be wondering, because the
attitude of many who remained silent was that of someone who has something on
the tip of their tongue, but shuts his mouth and keeps quiet.
One day,
one of our key sources, who we call The Officer, decided to listen to us, and
collaborated throughout the entire investigation. He is one of the commanders
on security issues in this government, a right-hand man of President Mauricio
Funes.
The first
meeting went on as had been agreed: only us and him, no tape recorders. We
mentioned José Adán Salazar Umaña, known as Chepe Diablo, and The Officer
nodded; we mentioned Juan Samayoa, mayor of Metapán, and Roberto "El
Burro" Herrera, as key partners, and he nodded again; the Texis Cartel,
the Cartel of Chepe Diablo, the cartel of El Caminito, the Northern Route, and The
Officer nodded. Nod, nod, nod ...
"Yeah,"
he said finally, naturally, without excitement. "All this sounds familiar.
Let me find out a bit more. Let's meet next week."
During
that week we made an attempt with a police chief who, after hearing our
presentation, initially kept silent. The week passed and we met with The
Official, who was holding some sheets of paper stapled together.
"So
you got some information?"
"Yes,
it's here," he said, tapping his index finger to the file, and then
silence again.
"What
does it say there?"
He went
silent for a few seconds. He put the sheets on the table, put his cell on the
pages and looked at us.
"Do
you know what you are getting into?" he asked, his expression serious. "Here
I have some information, but I want to know if you know what you're getting
into, because they send people to kill... that's how they operate. If you mess
with them, they deal with you. It's no joke."
We said
we knew. We told him that we had been hearing the same phrase, worded
differently from other people for weeks. He picked up his phone, opened the
pages and read us some generalities.
"They
operate in the so-called Northern Route ... they have international links with
Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico ... the Police of Metapán protects them... they
also protect themselves through hired assassins...
He made
it clear that he could not give us the document. We were so insistent that in
the end we came to an agreement. The Officer would prepare a report based on
the questions we asked.
"Maximum
nine questions," he warned us. We gave him 13, hoping he'd make the effort
to answer them all.
Weeks
later, The Officer gave us his answers. It was the first time we spoke of the
Secret Report, which is how he referred to the document.
During
those days we started to see more of The Detective. We were able to get at
least five meetings with him. The Detective does not take into account isolated
incidents, but complex plots that usually end with the name and last name of a
politician or businessman in the country.
Playing
devil's advocate, we asked him "Where do you get this information?"
during one of our last meetings.
"I
tell you something: until last year we had an informant who drove the car of
one of the major criminals in this country, one of the brains in money laundering...
I can't tell you any more."
The
Police have detectives who don't spend much time caged in offices. It is a
network of over 400 informants spread across the country who look, listen and
follow persons sought by the National Civil Police (PNC) or the DEA, because
often both institutions work together.
That was
the origin of the reports that came into our hands. The First and Second Report
agreed on one thing: who are the most important and most active members of the
Texis cartel. Chepe Diablo, the Mayor of Metapán and El Burro are mentioned in
both. The Reports have pictures of them together, at parties, at rodeos... and also show that they maintain a close relationship,
that they are in touch with each other and coordinate their operations.
What kind
of operations are coordinated by the cartel leaders? The reports illustrate
this with facts. On Saturday night, May 8, 2010, for example, José Adán Salazar
Umaña held a meeting in one of his six hotels. The appointment was in the hotel
Tolteka, located at the entrance to the State of Santa Ana. He arrived in an
SUV. At the meeting were Roberto Herrera, El Burro, a lawyer who the police and
the cartel know as El Sapo (The Frog in English), and another cartel member who
is nicknamed El Men, who had come on behalf of a money laundering specialist
and who is being monitored and pursued by the Police and the DEA.
The
Detective said that at the meeting, Chepe Diablo recommended that key members
of the organization should avoid carrying firearms. He argued that it was
inappropriate, as it was best to buy protection from the National Civil Police
(PNC) and the military. To implement the recommendations he urgently proposed
creating a special fund for the payment of bribes to police chiefs and military
officers.
The spies
had done a good job. El Burro, for example, is a man for whom the police have a
record for seven criminal sentences in El Salvador, from less serious crimes to
fraud and carrying, possessing and using weapons of war. This El Salvadoran
citizen also has U.S. citizenship. In that country, in California and Texas, he
has been arrested seven times for possession of weapons, attempted robbery,
possession of a stolen vehicle, and aggravated assault with a weapon, for which
he was sentenced to five years probation and a fine of 500 dollars.
On
Tuesday January 18 this year at 6:42 pm, a fax marked "URGENT"
arrived at the offices of Interpol in San Salvador. The message explained that
two federal agencies of the United States were looking for El Burro. One of
them, said the text, would not ask for extradition and the other had not yet
confirmed if it would. Therefore, Interpol in Washington asked: "Please
advise if your country knows the location of the aforementioned for purposes of
arresting him if the decision of the second agency is positive."
A month
later, Salvadoran police chased him and arrested him. The next day, La Prensa
Grafica reported the fact on its cover: "Drug-trafficking suspect arrested
in the West." However, they only held him for a few hours. There was some
confusion between the Salvadorans and the Interpol agents in Washington.
Finally, none of the two federal agencies of the United States requested
extradition, so there were no grounds to detain El Burro.
In 2010
the police officers following the case in El Salvador delivered an exclusive
report on El Burro, which proves that in El Salvador he has contacts at the
highest level. For instance, some stories: between January and February 2010,
investigators reported seeing him in a meeting at his hacienda El Rosario, in
Santa Ana. He was accompanied by Police Commissioner Fritz Gerard Dennery
Martinez, director of the Anti-Narcotics Division of the country. There were
also people from Guatemala and Mexico at the meeting. Three of these people
were later proved to be members of the Mexican cartel Los Zetas. A joint
report, prepared for the present administration of the Ministry of Security and
Justice, explained with greater detail the involvement of the senior official.
"He
is involved with the drug traffickers operating in the West ... He has been
reported by several witnesses to have received large sums of cash and also
vehicles. He also provides information and clears traffic routes in western El
Salvador for the criminal organization. He has participated in several meetings
with El Burro and other drug traffickers from the west at the Hacienda El
Rosario, located on Texis Street in Metapán," says the document.
Of all
the policemen linked by the documents to the Texis drug cartel, this was the
only one that created doubts in two senior police chiefs we consulted. Despite
indicating no knowledge of his meetings in El Rosario, both justified Martinez,
saying he is one of the key men in the fight against drug trafficking in the
west of the country.
The First
Report explains that El Burro and his allies operate numerous networks. For
example, it says that Salazar Adán José Umaña has at least 41 people and 19
vehicles in his cocaine distribution network both domestically and
internationally. It also explains that the network operates in five areas of
the country: Metapan, Merliot City, Apanteos Prison, La Esperanza Prison
(Mariona) and Apopa. This report has the number plate of each vehicle, the tax
identification number (NIT) and the name of each of the people on the network.
Internationally, the two reports agree, as do The Detective and The
Commissioner, that the Texis cartel operates as an independent organization in
Latin American cocaine trafficking. They are not lieutenants of the powerful
Mexicans or Colombians who resurface after their years of crisis. They become
employees of anyone who pays them, passing on the goods for whoever has the
money.
The route
starting in San Fernando is the most important link that El Salvador brings to the
whole Latin American cocaine traffic that travels to the United States.
The
reports range from general information to particular details. For example, an attachment
to the Second Report includes the type of functions performed by El Burro
within the organization. The Annex says: "On June 12, 2009, El Burro
coordinated the shipment of 40 members of the MS gang to receive military-type
training from the Los Zetas Group in the area known as La Laguna del Tigre, under
the jurisdiction of the State of Peten, Guatemala; of the 40 gang members, 12
were from El Salvador, and the rest Hondurans and Guatemalans."
Information
about the alleged relationship between gangsters and Zetas at that Lagoon in
Guatemala was published in national media and even in some foreign media such as the BBC.
On July
14, 2010, police spies followed El Burro to the restaurant Lover's Steak House in
Santa Ana, and what they heard there what was later written down in the 45-page
report devoted to this character and his connections. He met with three guests:
the police commissioner Victor Manuel Rodriguez Peraza, head of the Delegation
of Santa Ana, the Deputy Inspector Nataly Pérez Rodríguez and Patricia Costa de
Rodriguez, former governor of the State. She was alternate deputy for the
right-wing Arena party but ended the period 2006-2009 in the leftist FMLN. In
March this year she stepped down as governor to be a candidate for mayor of
Santa Ana for the Arena party. At the meeting, El Burro spoke of the problems
that Commissioner Mauricio Arriaza Chicas, western regional manager, was
creating by refusing to cooperate with the organization for cocaine trafficking
and cattle raising. Two senior police officers not involved in the preparation
of this document said they knew about the collaboration of the former governor
with the organization. The document said that the former official offered to
negotiate the transfer of Arriaza Chicas.
"He's
getting stupid, we must find a way to remove him," declared El Burro.
The
document also mentions that at another meeting dated July 25, 2010, just days
after the previous one, this time at the restaurant El Ganadero in the
Livestock Show at Santa Ana, El Burro delivered "a roll of bills" to
Commissioner Peraza and the Deputy Inspector Pérez Rodríguez.
The
reports, confirmed by people in the police who were guiding us, described El
Burro as a man of the highest-level contacts within the police. And this did
not only refer to recent contacts, like the Commissioner mentioned above, who
had been appointed to the job just five months before, El Burro handed him the
roll of bills as described.
"When
José Luis Tobar Prieto was director of the Police, El Burro used him as a
connection for some activities," says the report's attachment detailing
the connections of El Burro. Tobar Prieto was director of the PNC until
mid-2009.
In
another police report attachment, which was prepared for the headquarters of
the Ministry of Security and Justice, Tobar Prieto reappears as someone who was
associated with organizations of drug trafficking and money laundering
activities while he was director of the institution.
The First
and Second Reports grew in importance when our sources added more official
communications of the Police to those files. Both are rich in specific facts,
but left some gaps that only the answers to the 13 questions that we made to
The Official could give us the answer at that time.
Two weeks
had passed since our last meeting with The Official. He had promised to think
and decide if he would answer our questions, and we went to hear his decision.
We waited half an hour until someone told us that The Official was busy in a
meeting, but that he wanted to say something to us. We entered his office. He
didn't let us say a word. He was really pressed for time.
"Look,
I already warned you, you know what you are getting into here. I can't give you
the document but you have half an hour to get from it all the information you
can, "he said, and immediately threw on to a table a document marked
"Secret" on every page. For the first time we had to ourselves a
report that didn't come from the police, the Secret Report from one of the institutions
of the Security Department, that had the answers to our 13 questions with
intelligence data, and ranged from the identities of the trusted men of Chepe
Diablo to which officials support him and a description of the system of
storage and transportation of the cocaine.
When
leaving the office of The Official we had, for the first time, the three
reports that form the basis of this investigation. We analysed and compared
them and got routes backed by maps, matching names of police officers, deputies
and mayors, and links to murders and gang members. Afterwards we corroborated
all the information, going twice along the Caminito and visiting other parts of
the country, which allowed us to talk with military in the field, former policemen
frustrated by the border dynamics of cooperation, and tax inspectors. We also
studied business records, tax returns and reports included in the international
arrest warrants.
Those
identified as the ringleaders of the cartel are entrepreneurs immersed in the
market for grains, livestock, soccer officials, hotel owners... The latter
business, hotels, did shine a light on Chepe Diablo. It was that way that a tax
official began to notice his financial bonanza and become suspicious. This
former prosecutor of the Financial Crimes Unit had known about José Adán
Salazar since 2003.
"He's
a man who looks like an accountant. His office was in the basement of the
Capital Hotel in San Salvador. His hotels have never been full, and that is a
very well-known way to launder money: engaging in services that no one can
see," said the former prosecutor.
"But
he wasn't formally under investigation?" we asked.
"Let
me explain: he has always been suspected of laundering money, but I'd be lying
if I told you that someone was working correctly on this here, because to do
this you have to have a green light. And getting him into court is entirely a
different issue."
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| Extracto de informe de inteligencia sobre Cártel de Texis |
